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the agricultural use of an1~ls represents
tile IIDst global violation of animal rights.
Agricultural uses of animals are also arrong
the IIDst recalcitrant problems, since they
are deeply entrenched culturally and econo-

The major focus of the animal rights
movement, both philosophically and politically, has so far been on the abolition of
various institutional violations of animal
rights.
Factory farming, hunting, trapping,
whaling, and animal experimentation have been
argued to be fundamental violations of animal
rights and corresponding political campaigns
for abolishing these institutions have been
lIDunte:l.
Since it is only by dismantling
such institutions that the goals of the animal rights movement can be achieve:l, there
can be no doubt that abolition is a legitimate major focus of the IIDvement.

mically.
Agriculture is not an institution
which can simply be el1minate:l, in the way
that trapping, hunting, and whaling could be
el1minate:l, while leaving the rest of our
culture intact. We must gain sustenance, and
however we do it, animals and the environment
will be affecte:l.
Thus, we nee:} alternative
models, not simply abolition.
It might be argue:l, however, that agriculture is not a likely place to begin in
exploring models for peaceful and ethical coexistence with animals, since agriculture is
inherently destructive of the environment and
exploitive of animals.
Throughout history,
agriculture has been damaging to the soil,
ecosystems, and indigenous plant and animal
species. [ 2 ]
Marti Kheel has suggeste:l that
farming is a destructive patriarchal institution in which both animals and women are
exploited for their reproductive ability. [3]
And Paul Shepard sees in agriculture not only
environmental destruction but the destruction
of human character:

Nevertheless, there is a further issue
must be addresse:l, i f abolitionist
measures are to have permanent results: what
are the positive exchanges and relationships
we can have with animals and the environment?
We must learn to peacefully and ethically coexist in the environment with other species.
To insist that we have a purely "hands off"
attitude is to admit a fundamental ethical
defeat; it is to suppose that humans inevitably spoil and exploit all that we touch. I f
this is so, then it may well be that the long
term goals of the animal rights movement are
impossible to achieve.
Rather, we nee:} to
learn from the details of our past mistakes
and to build alternative models of ethical
ecologically healthy co-existence.
which

All agrarian societies share symptoms of homocentricity, illusions
of omnipotence, hatre:l of pre:latory
wild animals,
blunte:l body
or
blunte:l sensitivity, lack of interest
in non-economic plants and
animals, and the willingness to
drudge, with its deep, latent re-

The issues of peaceful co-existence and
ethical exchange are broad and complex, and I
do not intend to provide definitive answers
in what follows but, rather, to explore some
of these difficult issues in connection with
the agricultural use of animals.
The agricultural exploitation of animals is a particularly apt forum for exploring these issues,
for several reasons.
Both in terms of numbers of animals involve:l and extremity of
suffering inflicte:l upon those animals,[l]
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to recapitulate the arguments, ably made by
Tcxn Regan [ 7 ] , am:mg others, showing that the
animals typically reared on factory farms
have moral rights, including the right to
life.
While my analysis of the problem underlying modern agriculture does not directly
involve this latter issue, my
suggestions
for alternatives will assume that other species do have fundamental lTOral rights, such
as the right to life, and that to rear them
for slaughter in any manner is, therefore,
not a possible etl1ical option.

sentments, crude mixtures of rectitude and heaviness, and absence of
hur.or. [4]
If agriculture is inherently damaging,
then the best that we can do is to minimize
it.
Wenz has argued that the cultivation of
land is almost universally detrimental to an
ecosystem's health,
and that cultivation
should be minimized. [ 5 ]
He sees this as
providing an ecological argument for vegetarianism, since vegetarian diets require less
cultivation of land., (All the land used to
grow food for animals could be eliminated.)

Ivhy Agriculture Cannot be Hade
Ecologically Sound

But even if all that Shepard, Kheel, and
Wenz say about agriculture as historically
and currently practiced is granted, this does
not show that non-destructive and non-exploitive forms of agriculture cannot be developed. Scxne institutions, such as slavery,
are inherently exploitive and destructive.

Increasingly, farms are large operations
owned by businesspeople and corporations. It
is well known that small, family farms are
being squeezed out of existence by big business.
Approximately 650,000 farmers are
forced out of farming each year.
a~rently,
all the farming in the United states is done
by less than 4% of the population.
In contrast, in 1910, one third of the U.S. population lived and worked on farms. [9]
Such
large scale farming is ecologically damaging,
and the notorious "factory farmi~g" of animals is vastly less ethical and more environmentally damaging than diversified smallscale family farming. [9]
Surveying
this
situation from the point of view of its effects, we might suppose that large scale
agri-business could be made to be more ecologically sound--for example, through legislation mandating less use of harmful pesticides, more setting aside of land for wilderness, lTOre "organic" farming, and so on. It
is one of Wendell Berry's important contributions to have shown why agri-business cannot
be so reformed.UO] In much of my critique
of contemporary agriculture, I will be drawing on his insights.

But there is nothing inherently destructive
about agriculture in the broad sense of "cultivation of land." It is only by having been
practiced in particular ways, in conjunction
with other human institutions, that agriculture has become exploitive.
Simply minimizing agriculture as Wenz
suggests is not sufficient; a lesser evil is
an evil nonetheless.
And eliminating agriculture, besides being almost unthinkable,
does not guarantee that the alternatives will
be non-exploitive.
Hunting and gathering
have as much potential for exploitation as
agriculture.
Thus,
alternative, non-destructive and non-exploitive forms of agriculture are not only theoretically possible,
they are pragmatically necessary.
To begin to think about such alternatives, it may prove useful to consider what
has gone wrong with contemporary agriculture,
not merely from the perspective of the violations of animal rights but also from a broader ecological perspective.
It is beyond the
scope of this paper to document the suffering
inflicted upon animals via intensive rearing
practices, the health hazards visited upon
hunans by rrodern farming techniques and the
environmental destruction and pollution produced by rrodern factory farms.
These have
been well documented by others. [6]
Assuming
a degree of familiarity with the deleterious
effects of factory farming, I will direct my
attention
to underlying
principles
and
causes.
Similarly, space does not permit me
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The owner of the large-scale, corporate
farm is not a farmer but a businessperson.
His/her main concern is profit. Since he/she
does not live on the land, he/she is, at
most, indirectly concerned with the harmful
effects of the farming practices he/she dictates:
if they do not cut into profits,
he/she need not be concerned at all.
He/she
need not be concerned with the healthfulness
of the product he/she sells--as long as it
sells. Nor need he/she be concerned with the
long-term degradation of the land.
I f it is
necessary to pour more chemicals into the
land each year to make it produce as much as
18

it did the last, then so be it. Indeed, the
corporate farm fits into the broader corporate/capitalist picture very nicely, by consuming
large quantities of non-r61ewable
resources, such as petroleum and petroleum
by-products. The corporations which manufacture petro-chemicals, antibiotics, and pesticides encourage the agri-businessperson to
constantly increase consumption of energy
sources in order to "boost yield."[ll] Since
agri-business
is economically intertwined
with these industries, there is a disincentive for energy conservation.
Indeed, the
self-sufficient farmer who produces his/her
own food and has no need for the petrochemical industry is an anathema to the cor-

is because he/she is not paid to be concerned
with such things. But beyond this economic
allegiance, the agri-scientist cannot provide
the type of knowledge needed for healthy
farming.
For, the agri-scientist is a specialist, and the specialist, by definition,
has a narrow conception of problems and their
solutions. As Berry points out, the specialist solves a problem without raising the
question of the broad impact of the solution
on the environment as a whole.
For example,
the specialist solves the problem of insect
iflfestation by developing a pesticide, without ralslng the question of the long-term,
cumulative effects of the pesticide on the
environment and on animal species.
The specialist sees his/her knowledge not only as
specialized but also as ethically neutral.
Within a system of specialists, it is no
one's job to see that all the particular
solutions work well for the whole.

porate establish~ent. As Berry has pointed
out, it is typical of the agri-business approach to farming to take a solution, such as
the use of animal wastes for fertilizer, and
generate from it two problems: the pollution
created by the dumping of animal wastes into
streams and the "need" for chemical fertilizers. [12]

But,
as Berry's analysis shows, [15]
agriculture is an important instance of a
fundamental ecological fact:
the complexity
and interconnectedness of ecosystems.
(An
axian of ecology is that you can't do just
one thing.)
In the case of agriculture,
there is a fundamental interconnectedness of
the farmland, the surrounding wilderness, and
the human corrrnunities.
What is required,
then, is an understanding of the whole system
and these complex inter-relationships; sanething which the specialist cannot offer.

'Ihe agri-business establishment is not
intentionally against healthy farming practices, of course.
It is simply that health
does not figure in any way in the businessperson's bottom line: profit. Servicing the
agri-business corrrnunity with dangerous chemicals, such as pesticides, chemical fertilizers, herbicides, and antibiotics, is highly
profitable. since there is no internal pressure for ecologically sound farming within
the agri-business establishment, the responsibility for protecting humans a~d the environment from the danaging effects of agribusiness farming is external; it rests in the
hands of government agencies and independent
organizations.
But government agencies notoriously are staffed with former and future
members of the agri-business and petro-chemical establishment.
And the independent organizations are vastly out-lobbied and outfunded by special interests in the agri ousiness and petro-chemical industries. [13 ]

In the absence of a complex understanding of the environment within which farming
takes place, the specialist imposes total
control.
The agri-scientist, like his sibling in biomedical research, views living
organisms
and land via a machine metaphor. [16] The idea of total control and the'
machine metaphor have a long history in science, [17] but for the specialist in agriculture, it can hardly be otherwise.
For, as
Berry argues, [18] the specialist puts himself
in charge of just one possibility. All other
factors, then, must be eliminated.
This
requires making chemical and physical boundaries, so that absolute control becomes at
least a eleoretical possibility.
Weeds,
insects, diseases, the weather, and people
are unpredictable; leave them out.
The natural rrothering instincts of animals are
unpredictable; leave them out and substitute
automated farrowing pens and artificial insemination. v.'hat the agri-scientist fails to
notice is elat, aside from having left behind

But beyond these economic and political
considerations, there lies another fundamental reason why agri -business cannot be reformed.
The agri-businessperson, who neither
lives on the land that he/she "farms" nor
even knows much about farming, inevitably
depends upon the agri-science specialist to
tell him/her how to make the biggest profit.
But the agri-scientist is not concarned with
health and ecological balance. In part, this
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farmer.
Agricultural schools could develop
tedmologies, such as farm equipnent, designed to the scale of the small farm.
Such
was the original purpose of the land grant
colleges, [23] but they have been subverted by
the agri-business establishment.

any semblance of an ethical regard for humans
and other animals, he/she has also left behind health.
For, as Berry points out, [19]
in order to be healthy, crops and animals
must have resistance; such resistance is a
large part of what we mean by "health."
By
imposing boundaries and controls, the agriscientist eliminates this resistance. And we
are increasingly forced to confront the calamitous results.[20]

One clear consequence of the analysis so
far is that a healthy agriculture must be
labor intensive.
We cannot entrust the
health of the land to a few agri-business
executives and agri-scientists and achieve a
healthy outcOOle, just as we would not expect
to achieve health by entrusting the ("'..are of
hundreds of people to one or two profitoriented doctors.
While it may not be obvi0us, the current crisis is also a crisis for
the environmentalist and even for the proponent of animal rights.
For, with the p=lssing
of small farm communities will p=lss an important possibility:
the possibility of an
ecologically sound agriculture.
When all
farms are owned by a few corporate giants,
there will be no turning back from the control of land and animals (including humans)
for sheer profit.

Cannot the agri-scientist become cogniZant of these factors, becoming more ecologically conscious and less specialized? We have
seen a p=lrallel developnent in modem medicine.
Twenty years ago, the medical establishment I s model for childbirth was also a
model of total control. This model has been
replaced by the model of natural childbirth,
which does not allow total control but which
eventuates in much healthier infants.
It
lnight be argued that the agri-scientist is
already learning this lesson, as evidenced by
the recent developnent of such programs as
integrated pest management, [21]
which replaces harmful pesticides with natural insect
controls, such as predatory insects, parasites, weather, crop rotation, and pest resistant crop varieties.

A New Ethic for Agriculture
Making farms smaller and more labor
intensive is, of course, only a small part of
what must be done in order to make farming
ecologically healthy. Sane of the further
ingredients of healthy agriculture can be
deduced from the negative critique of agribusiness.
A healthy farm is part of the
ecosystem surrounding it, and ecosystems, to
be healthy, must be complex.
A vast rnonoculture of grain robs the soil of essential
nutrients, leads to loss of topsoil and erosion, and ultimately becomes "sick," requiring chemical fertilizers in order to produce.
In contrast, a diversified farm in which
fields are planted to a variety of species,
including
perennials
and
soil-enriching
grasses, is renewing to the soil. The principle of renewal and return, as Berry has
pointed out, [24] is essential to healthy
agriculture and is lacking in the agri-business approach.

While agri-science might transcend the
model of total control, there is a further
factor which prevents the agri-scientist fr~n
providing the knowledge for an ecologically
healthy agriculture.
The sort of training
that the agri-scientist receives is not only
specialized; in another sense, it is also
generalized:
it does not address itself to
the particular properties of a field, of the
surrounding environment or cOlllllunity.
But,
as Berry argues, [22] the former must adapt
crops to the p=lrticularities of the land.
,The good husbandperson is responsive to the
health and needs of both land and =mnunity •
Such particular knowledge cannot be put into
an agricultural school curriculum.
It is
learned by living on the land.
Lacking such
knowledge, the agricultural scientist imposes
a uniform and generalized model, r~noving
trees and hedgerows, prescribing vast acres
of m::mo-cultural crops, oversi-rnplified and
monotonous as tract hanes.

But the ecological complexity of a healthy farm includes not only a diversity of
plant life but a diversity of animal life.
Healthy soil is full of micro-organisms and
worms.
An agriculture which does not rely
upon pesticides requires the presence of many
other species:
of reptiles, birds, and amphibians to control insect population. And

No amount of technology can replace the
particular knowledge which familiarity with
the land provides. The agri-scientist could,
however, canbine his general knowledge with
the particular knowledge of the small, family
B~
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this problem.

t.hese latter creatures' members must be kept
in balance by the presence of predators:
raptors, weasels, mink, foxes, etc. These

Our current alienation may in part arise
from our alienation fran the land.
Berry's
analysis
of this latter phenomej10n may,
therefore, be usefully extended to understand
the inability to form positive exchanges with
animals.
Berry observes that both agriscientists and traditional conservationists
(along with most of the rest of us) view the
land as divided into two types:
wilderness,
which is to be left alone and unspoiled, and
danesticated land, which is to be used and
ultimately used up and defiled. [26] Neither
conservationist nor agri-scientist has any
well articulated idea where humans fit into
the landscape.
(In fact, both specifically
exclude humans from agricultural and wilderness landscapes.) Needless to say, most of
the rest of us do not feel a strong connection to the land.
.Many of us are "rrobile,"
meaning that we do not identify with any
place in particular.
We feel unconnected
and, therefore, not responsible to any particular place.
Our alienation has proceeded
to the point that we are unaware of the
ultimate sources of the food we consume.
Farming is left to the specialists, and wilderness is a place to visit and observe, not
a place to live and work.

latter also control small, mammalian herbivores which can overrun crops.
It is necessary to transcend the agri-scientist's vision
of total control to see all these species as
beneficial and, in fact, necessary to healthy
agricultluce, rather e1an as requiring removal.[25]
A healthy agricultural landscape
thus requires a mixing of the danestic and
the wild, of fields, hedgerows, ponds, and
trees, to provide habitat for the various
species which are necessary to a healthy
agriculture.
It is these species, and not
the traditional domestic farm animals, which
I would argue are the most crucial animals in
agriculture. It is hard to envision from our
current practices such peaceful alliances,
especially since farmers are responsible for
so much "predator eradication."
The felt
need for predator control in agriculture
arises fran a number of sources, and the
details of this controversy are beyond the
scope of this discussion.
Utilitarian arguments for and against the usefulness of hunting and trapping are beside the point, since
hunting and trapping are in violation of the
rights of the victims of these activities.
However, one major source of the conflict
between farmers and wildlife revolves around
the keeping of danestic animals, and this is
a topic which must be considered. If farmers
were to cease to keep domestic animals, such
as sheep, cattle, and chickens, the need to
control the foxes, wolves, and coyotes who
occasionally prey upon them would vanish.
What role can the traditional domestic farm
animals play in an ecologically healthy,
rights-respecting agriculture?

In light of our separation fran the
land, it is not surprising ~t we find ourselves separated fran animals. We extend the
above-mentioned division of land to segregate
animals into two types: those which are wild
and can only be observed fran a distance and
those which are danesticated (Le.,
exploited, treated like machines, and, like the
farmland, ultimately used up). Just as "progress" has left us with no rrodern rrodel which
locates humans inan ecologically healthy
landscape, we have no idea how to engage in
non-exploitive exchanges with animals.
We
must think of those two problems simultaneously, i f we seek an ecologically healthy
agriculture, since, as we have seen, an ecologically healthy agriculture requires the
presence of many animal species.
Ecological
health must necessarily be the framework
wierin which ethical and non-exploitive interaction with animals is defined.

Danestic Farm Animals:
Out of the Frying Pan, into the Void?
The issue of our relations with danestic
farm and companion animals is a vast, uncharted region, and our inability to cope
with it is a measure of our inability to
envision positive exchanges with other species.
Critiques of our current relations
with domestic animals show that these relations are exploi ti ve and should be elirni nated~
they do not tell us what should replace our current institutions.
Why do we
have such difficulty envisioning positive
relationships with animals?
I believe that
answering this latter question may help us
clear away sane of the barriers to working on

Imlst

In light of these considerations, we
examine carefully the notion of "danes-

tic animal." Under one construction, a domestic animal is simply one which has been
genetically altered in such a way that its
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close contacts, animal rights
become abstract and distant.

behavior and appearance is quite different
from its wild relatives.
To this fairly
neutral, biological definition, we can add
the undeniable fact t.~at the rrodifications
have all been wrought with the goal of exploiting the animals for various purposes.
In genetically altering other species, we
have not had in mind the PJIpose of improving
their overall well-being.
We could not, of
course, accomplish this as well as natural
selection does, anyway. Rather, our purpose
has been to further our own ends in extracting eggs, meat, milk, and gannent materials.
The very concept of "domestic animal" is thus
laden with connotations of degradation and
exploitation.
One might ask whether it is
not too severe to view the'll as fundamentally
degraded, as "genetic goofies," as Shep:rrd
puts it.[27]

may

Second, we must address the issue of a
"fair exchange" with domestic animals.
This
is especially important in the case of "fann"
animals.
For, i f they are to be a part of
farms, they should contribute materially and
not simply become companion animals, for two
reasons.
Farms are, arrong other things,
econanic institutions, and they must be economically viable.
Those who live on the
farms must contribute.
Further, even if it
were econanically viable, keeping fann animals as companions, or "out of the goodness
of our hearts," may well lead to exploitation.
The fair exchange problem is exceedingly difficult, and any solutions offered
will be suspect as long as humans own domestic animals.
Ownership implies a kind of
power incompatible with a domestic animal •s
lobbying an effective complaint regarding an
unfair exchange.
Thus, a necessary antecedent condition to effectively working out the
fair exchange problem may be the abolition of
ownership of domestic animals and its replacement with sane other model, such as that
of stewardship or adoption.

Let us recall, though, that the same
sorts of things can be said about domestic
land. It is the land which is altered to our'
purposes, which is generally degraded and
exploited.
It need not be. The alternative
involves a softening of the distinction between domestic and wild--an accorrm:>dation to
the wild and uncontrolled in the domestic
landscape.
Si:nilarly, we need to develop a
recognition of relationships with animals
that are neither entirely wild (outside the
boundaries of our landscape) nor entirely
demesticated.
There is another sense of
"demesticated" which might be invoked here:
the sense of causing to feel at home, or
naturalization.
Arrong
domestic animals,
there may be species which can be acCOIllI1Ddated by us in non-exploitive ways.
It is
necessary to examine each case individually,
taking into account the effects of including
domestic animals on the ecosystem (since
domestic animals can upset the balance and
displace local wild populations). Obviously,
a number of other factors must be considered,
as well.

Jim Harter,

~~imBls:
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First, we might raise the question of
the point of perpetuating domestic species.
I have nothing definitive to say on this
point, other than that i f they can be maintained non-exploitively, then the companionship they offer may be a valuable force in
furthering and maintaining the goals of animal rights.
While IhilosoIhical arguments
and respect for wildlife are valuable tools
in furthering animal rights, many people are
moved to action because they have known and
cared about particular animals. Without such
BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES

issues
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Even assuming that we could develop a
legal roodel allowing advocacy of the interests of domestic animals, the issue of their
genuine interests will be complicated by
their very domesticity. Their interests have
so long been warped to serve ours 1 how can we
determine whether it is fair to take the eggs
from domestic chickens or the wool frem domestic sheep?
It is part of their "warped"
telos to accept us as their protectors.
22

Should we respect this interest or attempt to
eliminate it?

problems in agriculture and begin to talk and
work with both fanners and ecologists.

addition to all the difficulties in
determining the interests and rights of domestic animals, there is the further issue of
ecological health to consider. Those arguing
for the rights of animals should not ignore
environmental issues, nor should environmentalists ignore issues of rights. It is beyond

While the task of developing non-exploitive exchanges with animals is formid. able, I hope that I have succeeded in arguing
for the importance of doing so. The develop-

In

ment of such models may appear utopian, but I
think that it is no more utopian than the
model of abolition which it attempts to transcend. Until such positive models are developed, the goals of abolition lnay themselves
appear impossible, in that they create a void
without telling us how it will be filled.

the scope of this essay to show that these
two perspectives can be reconciled, but it is
one of the lessons of Berry's analysis regarding specialization that we must not impose specialized solutions where ecological
<XlInplexity is involved.
Thus, we must inquire whether keeping domestic animals can be
ecologically enriching.
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